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Abstract
We consider a crowdsourcing data acquisition sce-
nario, such as federated learning, where a Center
collects data points from a set of rational Agents,
with the aim of training a model. For linear re-
gression models, we show how a payment structure
can be designed to incentivize the agents to pro-
vide high-quality data as early as possible, based on
a characterization of the influence that data points
have on the loss function of the model. Our contri-
butions can be summarized as follows: (a) we prove
theoretically that this scheme ensures truthful data
reporting as a game-theoretic equilibrium and fur-
ther demonstrate its robustness against mixtures of
truthful and heuristic data reports, (b) we design a
procedure according to which the influence com-
putation can be efficiently approximated and pro-
cessed sequentially in batches over time, (c) we de-
velop a theory that allows correcting the difference
between the influence and the overall change in loss
and (d) we evaluate our approach on real datasets,
confirming our theoretical findings.
1 Introduction
The success of machine learning depends to a large extent on
the availability of high quality data. For many applications,
data has to be elicited from independent and sometimes self-
interested data providers. A good example is federated learn-
ing [Konecˇny` et al., 2016], where a single Center (e.g. a large
company) collects data from a set of Agents to jointly learn a
model.
So far, research in federated learning has focused on pro-
tecting the privacy of contributed data, but has not consid-
ered how to reward the Agents for the data they provided.
A particular challenge is that these rewards should be scaled
so that data is paid according to its quality, i.e., how use-
ful it is for learning the model. Other examples of such
settings can be found in crowdsourcing. A prominent ex-
ample of crowdsourcing is the Oxford English Dictionary1,
which invites entries from the crowd on a voluntary basis, or
1http://www.oed.com/
more recently, the Open Street Map platform2, an alternative
to Google Maps, which is built on information provided by
users.
Given that gathering accurate data is often a costly task,
one shouldn’t expect the Agents to exert the required effort
unless they are properly compensated. This phenomenon has
been documented in practice (e.g., see [Vuurens et al., 2011;
Shah et al., 2015] and references therein) and is justified by
the principles of agent rationality, an integral part of the field
of game theory. Game theory tells us that we should be re-
warding agents monetarily, with their payments being depen-
dent on the quality of the data they provide. However, to do
this, we first need to answer the following question: “What
constitutes high-quality data?”
Intuitively, a high-quality data point is one that improves
the accuracy of the model. We should be looking to give
higher rewards to the agents that provide useful data, com-
pared to those agents that do not contribute to improving the
estimation. Additionally, we would like to reward more to
agents that provide their data as early as possible.
1.1 Our Approach
We consider a crowdsourcing scenario like the one described
above, and we aim to design incentive schemes, i.e., mech-
anisms that reward the Agents proportionally to the effect
that they have on the accuracy of the model. A clear way
of measuring the effect of individual points on the accuracy
of a model is via the classical notion of influence [Cook and
Weisberg, 1980]. For a given data point, the influence quan-
tifies how much the model’s predictions would change if that
point was not used in the training process. This allows us
to quantify the effect that a single point has on the final out-
come; we can simply remove the point, retrain, and compare
the difference in the loss function. Based on the influence, we
design schemes that reward agents proportionally to the de-
crease in the loss function due to their provided data points.
This is desirable for the Center, since it will only have to pay
for useful data and has the guarantee that the total cost of the
data acquisition process will be bounded.
We will show theoretically that the prescribed behavior,
i.e., exerting the required effort to extract a sample from the
underlying distribution and reporting that sample, is the best
2https://www.openstreetmap.org/about
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option for the agents under reasonable assumptions. In game-
theoretic terms, we prove that our incentive schemes induce
this type behavior as an equilibrium of the corresponding
game. We strengthen our result by showing the robustness
of the scheme against heuristic reports, i.e., agents that do not
exert the effort to obtain useful information, and simply pro-
vide some untruthful report. Specifically, we show that (a) if
the Center has independent data for testing, then the agents
are always incentivized to provide truthful reports and (b) the
same holds even if the test set is assembled by the reports
of the agents, and a fraction of the agents decide to use an
uninformed strategy.
For many practical applications computing the exact influ-
ence is prohibitively inefficient. For this reason, following
Koh and Liang [2017], we compute an approximation of the
exact influence, based on up-weighing the training point by a
small quantity. Our proposed approximation extends the idea
in [Koh and Liang, 2017], which turns out to be insufficient
for our purposes. We show that the employed approximation
is very close to the value of the exact influence, while achiev-
ing a notable improvement in speed for datasets of sufficiently
high dimensions.
Then, we consider the case where the data points arrive se-
quentially; this captures most real-life scenarios of interest, as
the data acquisition process is usually sequential. We employ
our incentive scheme to reward the agents in batches, with
the fundamental property that agents that provide their data
earlier are rewarded more, a desirable property as explained
above. We consider two alternatives when it comes to the in-
fluence of data points in the current batch: M-Inclusive, in
which we include the data points of the current batch in train-
ing and M-Exclusive, in which we do not.
Another issue that arises when considering sequential re-
warding is, “How do we reward the first data points to ar-
rive?”, as it is not clear how to measure the decrease in the
loss function. For example, the Center might have prior
knowledge that it can use to compute the initial influences.
In this paper, we adopt the simple approach of initializing the
model with samples from a uniform distribution as a model of
a knowledge-less initialization. The strength of this assump-
tion is that it works in all scenarios, regardless of any possible
availability of initial data points. We analytically show how
the presence of the initial points affects the relation between
the influence and the decrease in the loss function, for both
the M-Inclusive and the M-Exclusive case.
Finally, we run experiments on several different real
datasets, as well as generated data, and verify our theoreti-
cal results.
1.2 Related Work
The topic of learning a model when the input data points
are provided by strategic sources has been the focus of a
growing literature at the intersection of machine learning and
game theory. A significant amount of work has been de-
voted to the setting in which Agents are interested in the
outcome of the estimation process itself, e.g., when they are
trying to sway the learned model closer to their own data
points [Perote and Perote-Pena, 2004; Dekel et al., 2010;
Meir et al., 2012; Caragiannis et al., 2016; Chen et al.,
2018b]. Our setting is concerned with the fundamental ques-
tion of eliciting accurate data when data acquisition is costly
for the agents, or when they are not willing to share their data
without some form of monetary compensation. Another line
of work considers settings in which the Agents have to be
compensated for their loss of privacy [Cummings et al., 2015;
Chen et al., 2018a].
A similar question to the one in our paper was considered
by Cai et al. [2015], where the authors design strategy-proof
mechanisms for eliciting data and achieving a desired trade-
off between the accuracy of the model and the payments is-
sued. The guarantees provided, while desirable, are subject
to certain strong assumptions. The authors assume that each
agent chooses an effort level, and the variance of the accu-
racy of their reports is a strictly decreasing convex function
of that effort. Furthermore, these functions need to be known
to the Center. Here, we only require that the cost of effort
is bounded by a known quantity. Furthermore, our strategy
space is more expressive in the sense that, as in real-life sce-
narios, data providers can choose which data to provide and
not just which effort level to exert. A similar model to [Cai
et al., 2015] was considered in [Westenbroek et al., 2017;
Westenbroek et al., 2019], for the case of multiple Centers
eliciting data from the crowd.
Our ideas are closely related to the literature of Peer Con-
sistency mechanisms [Faltings and Radanovic, 2017] and
Peer Prediction mechanisms for crowdsourcing [Radanovic
et al., 2016]. The idea behind this literature is to extract high-
quality information from individuals by comparing their re-
ports against those of randomly chosen peers. This approach
has been largely successful in eliciting truthful information.
The same principle applies to our case, where the payments
are dependent on the improvement of the model and therefore
agents are rewarded for providing helpful information. Fi-
nally, Jia et al. [2019] recently considered a setting in which
the value of the provided data information is determined via
the Shapley value. Their approach is inherently different from
ours, but it is worth noting that they consider the influence ap-
proximation of [Koh and Liang, 2017] for approximating the
Shapley value.
2 Setting and Foundations
In our setting, there is a Center that wants to learn a model
parametrized by θ, with a non-negative loss function L(z, θ)
on a sample z = (x, y). In this paper, we will assume that the
model is a linear regression model, but our general approach
extends to other regression models as well. The samples are
supplied by a set A of Agents, with agent i providing point
zi = (xi, yi). We will denote by A−i the set of agents with-
out agent i. Given a set of data Z = {zi}ni=1, the empirical
risk is R(Z, θ) = 1n
∑
i L(zi, θ).
It is assumed that each Agent i must exert effort ei(zi) to
provide data point zi. We adopt a simple effort model, in
which the agent either exerts some effort e to make an obser-
vation, or exerts zero effort, so ei(zi) will be either e or 0. We
assume that e is fixed among agents, but we can easily adapt
our results to the case of individual efforts ei per agent.
Influence and Incentive Schemes
The Center must compensate the Agents for the effort they
exert with some payment p(zi). We consider self-interested
agents, that are trying to maximize the quantity pi(zi) −
ei(zi); we will refer to zi as the strategy of agent i. For ex-
ample, exerting effort and extracting a data point from the un-
derlying distribution is a desirable strategy, whereas reporting
random noise (e.g., sampling from the uniform distribution,
with no regard to the underlying model) is an undesirable
strategy. We refer to the former case as a truthful strategy
and to the latter case as a heuristic strategy.
An incentive scheme is a function that maps data points
zi to payments p(zi); intuitively, a good incentive scheme
should overcome the cost of effort (as otherwise agents are
not incentivized to submit any observations) but also, cru-
cially, to reward based on the effect that the data point zi has
on improving the accuracy of the trained model. For this rea-
son, we will design incentive schemes via the use of influ-
ences. Let Z/j = {zi}i 6=j and let
θˆ = arg min
θ
R(Z, θ) and θˆ/j = arg min
θ
R(Z/j , θ).
We will assume that the Center is in possession of an test set
T = {zk}. Then the influence of zj on the test set is defined
as
infl(zj , T, θ) = R(T, θˆ/j)−R(T, θˆ).
We will simply write infl(zj), when T and θ are clear from
the context. Then, we can design incentive schemes based on
the following general principle:
- Compute the influence of the report zj of each Agent j on
the test set T .
- Assign a score (payment) to the agent proportional to the
influence of zj .
- Scale the scores appropriately to ensure that it is higher
than the cost of effort ej(zj) for agent j.
Following standard game-theoretic terminlogy, we will say
that an agent supplying point rj is best responding to the set
of strategies r−j chosen by the other agents, if the strategy
that it has chosen maximizes the quantity E[pi(rj , r−j) −
ei(zj)] over all possible alternative reports z′j , where the ex-
pectation is over the distribution of reports of the other agents.
We will say that a vector of strategies (i.e., a strategy profile)
(r1, . . . , rn) is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium (BNE) if for each
agent j, rj is a best response. Below, we prove that the pro-
file of truthful strategies is a BNE.
Theorem 2.1. Suppose that the agents believe that their ob-
servations have mean 0 error. Given an agent j, suppose
agents A/j all follow truthful strategies. Then, agent j max-
imizes its expected influence by being following the truthful
strategy as well.
Proof. Let oj = zj + δ = (xj , yj + δ), be the sample
that agent j observes, where δ is random variable with mean
0. If agent j reports rj , its score is R(T, θˆ/j) − R(T, θˆ).
Since R(T, θˆ/j) is fixed, then agent j wishes to minimize
R(T, θˆ). Let us assume that the true distribution of samples
is Φ, but that agent j does not know Φ. Then, in expecta-
tion, R(T, θˆ) =
∫
Φ
R(φ, θˆ)dφ. Given a sufficient number of
samples to compute θˆ/j ,
∫
Φ
R(φ, θˆ)dφ = Rmin, the mini-
mum possible risk for the model family. Since agent j has
no knowledge of Φ, then only by reporting oj can agent j
guarantee that in expectation he’s moving θˆ closer to the true
optimum. Therefore agent j maximizes his expected score by
reporting oj , i.e., by using the truthful strategy.
The BNE result then follows immediately from the fact
that, according to the incentive scheme, higher influences
yield higher payments and the cost of effort is covered when
the reports are truthful.
3 Methods
3.1 Influence Approximation
Trying to practically implement an incentive-based payment
mechanism imposes a host of challenges. The first is the
computational cost of computing the influence for an agent.
Specifically, we must compute θˆ/j , which would involve en-
tirely retraining the model. We present an approximation
method based on the method described in [Koh and Liang,
2017], which gives the following formula for the influence of
zj on test point ztest:
infl(ztest, zj) =
1
n
∇θL(ztest, θˆ)H−1θ ∇θL(z, θˆ)
This formula is derived by taking the first term of the Taylor
expansion of the empirical risk with respect to θ, which yields
an approximation error of O(1/n2). However, this approxi-
mation has the undesirable property that the mean influence is
0, by the definition of θˆ as the solution to
∑∇θL(z, θˆ) = 0.
We can eliminate this property by including the second order
term in the Taylor expansion of the empirical risk. Let ∂θj be
the change in theta due to up-weighting a training point zj ,
and let Hi be the Hessian computed only on zi.
.
∂θj =
1
n
H−1θ ∇θL(zi, θˆ) +
1
n2
H−1θ HiH
−1
θ ∇θL(zi, θˆ)
We must also take into account the second order approxima-
tion of the change in the loss on a test point when computing
the influence. Rather than approximate the change in test loss
by infl(ztest, z) = (∇θL(ztest, θˆ))·∂θ, we take the second term
in the Taylor expansion:
infl(ztest, z) =
(
∇θL(ztest, θˆ) + 1
2
Hθ,ztest · ∂θ
)
· ∂θ
For the case of linear regression, computing θˆ/j for each
data point can be computationally infeasible, but we show in
Fig. 1 that, while the computation time for the approximation
grows faster with the number of test points, given a fixed test
set the approximation will improve computation time given a
high enough input dimension. For a model that is learned via
an SGD method, it is clear that the influence approximation
will provide significant improvements.
3.2 Batch Processing
In a practical implementation, data arrives sequentially. Prior,
we assumed that the influences would be computed over the
entire dataset once all the data has been collected. Ideally, the
Center could compute the influence and provide the payment
Figure 1: Computation Times of Exact and Approximate Influences
over 2000 training points.
immediately when a data point arrives. This has the addi-
tional advantage of allowing the Center to perform a priori
budgeting. Suppose we have a dataset {zi} such that i indi-
cates the time of arrival of each datapoint. Then the sum of
influences is the overall change in loss from the dataset.
n∑
j=0
R(T, θˆ{zi}i<j )−R(T, θˆ{zi}i≤j ) = R(T, θˆ∅)−R(T, θˆ{zi})
By assigning a utility to the overall change in risk, the Cen-
ter can budget the entire data collection period before imple-
menting the mechanism. However, computing the influence
for each data point as it arrives can be computationally pro-
hibitive, even using the influence approximation. The com-
putation time of the approximation, in terms of complexity, is
dominated by computing H−1, which must be computed ev-
ery time the model is updated. The Center can strike a balance
between the two extremes by grouping the data into batches,
such that H−1 is only computed once per batch.
It is clear that with respect to a single batch, the game theory
is the same as the one-batch case, however, we must now con-
sider how batch processing affects incentives with respect to
the time of reporting. We observe the following: the influence
approximation presented in [Koh and Liang, 2017] has abso-
lute error with respect to the exact influence of O( 1n2 ), and
the influence approximation is 0 in expectation as shown in
3.1. Therefore, in expectation, the exact influence is O( 1n2 ).
With this it is clear that batch processing incentivizes Agents
to report as early as possible, which is a desirable property
for the Center. We show empirically that this is the case in
Fig. 2.
3.3 Initializing the Model
One point we did not address was the meaning of θˆ∅: the
optimal parameters of the model given no training dataset.
In many cases, for example for linear regression, this is not
properly defined. We term this the initialization of the model.
We interpret this initial model as the aggregate knowledge of
the Center prior to the data collection period. If the Center
already has some data it can use for training, then intuitively
Figure 2: Influence of 30 batches with batch size 100. Influence
decreases rapidly after the first few batches.
it won’t need to collect as many data points or spend as much
money during the data collection period. If the Center, rather
than having a prior dataset, has some knowledge about the
distribution of the model it wishes to learn, it can artificially
generate a dataset by sampling from this prior distribution,
with the number of samples corresponding to the confidence
of the Center in the prior model. In the case where the Center
has no prior knowledge, we consider this from an information
theoretic perspective to be a state of maximum entropy, and
therefore the initial model would be determined by sampling
from the uniform distribution within the appropriate bounds.
3.4 M-Inclusive and M-Exclusive
With batch processing, the Center has two further choices in
how to implement the mechanism. The Center may include
the most current batch in updating the model and compute
the influence of each data point as though it were removed, or
it could exclude the current batch and compute the influence
of each data point as though it were added to the rest. We
call these two methods M-Inclusive and M-Exclusive respec-
tively. It is clear by construction that these two methods are
equivalent with a batch size of one, in which case the sum of
influences is equal to the overall change in risk. For the sake
of computational efficiency, the Center may wish to choose
a batch size > 1. We restrict ourselves to the case of a lin-
ear regression model, but the analysis can be extended to any
model in which the optimal parameters have a closed-form
solution.
Let us consider two probability distributions Φ1 and Φ2, and
we assume they describe an input-output relationship such
that Φ(x, y) = q(x)p(y|x), and q1(x) = q2(x). This assump-
tion merely asserts that the data we are collecting is drawn
from the same domain regardless of the distribution of the
output. Distributions Φ1 and Φ2 determine, in expectation,
models M1 and M2 respectively. Let us now define Ri,j as
the expected risk of model Mi evaluated on distribution Φj .
Using the standard mean-squared-error loss function, we have
that Ri,j = Rj,j + E[(Mi −Mj)2]. Now suppose we sam-
ple N1 points from Φ1 and N2 points from Φ2 to form our
training set {z}. Because the linear regression solution is lin-
ear with respect to y, and q(x) is fixed, then {z} determines
in expectation a model Mc = N1M1+N2M2N1+N2 . With this, let
us consider the practical application where Φ1 is the initial-
ization distribution and Φ2 is the distribution of reports from
the Agents. Then when we evaluate the model, we are only
concerned with the error of the mixed modelMc evaluated on
Φ2:
Rc,2 = R2,2 +
(
N1
N1 +N2
)2
E
[
(M2 −M1)2
]
To simplify, we fix N1 = Q as the number of points used for
initialization, we define r = E[(M2 −M1)2], and we let N2
vary as x. Then we have our expected empirical risk in terms
of x:
R(x) =
Q2r
(Q+ x)2
+R2,2
We can approximate the influence of a data point arriving
after x data points as the negative of the derivative of the risk:
−∂R
∂x
=
2Q2r
(Q+ x)3
Then we can compute the overall change in loss with n data
points:
∆R = R(0)−R(n) = rn(2Q+ n)
(Q+ n)2
Now we consider the sum of influences of points in batches
of batch size b. Consider the sum of influences for batch k:
S(k) = −bR′(kb) = 2bQ
2r
(Q+ kb)3
Consider the sum of influences across all batches for both
M-Inclusive and M-Exclusive:
Sinc = 2bQ
2r
n/b∑
k=1
1
(Q+ kb)3
, Sexc = 2bQ
2r
n/b−1∑
k=0
1
(Q+ kb)3
Comparing these to the change in risk, we get the following
ratios in terms of the batch size:
Dinc(b) =
Sinc
∆R
=
Q2(Q+ n)2[ψ′′
(
Q+n
b
+ 1
)− ψ′′(Q
b
+ 1)]
n(2Q+ n)b2
Dexc(b) =
Sexc
∆R
=
Q2(Q+ n)2[ψ′′(Q+n
b
)− ψ′′(Q
b
)]
n(2Q+ n)b2
where ψ′′(x) is the second derivative of the Digamma func-
tion. By computing these values, the Center can pick an ar-
bitrary batch size and normalize the scores such that the ex-
pected sum of influences is equal to the overall change in risk.
3.5 Heuristic Reporting
We have shown in Theorem 2.1 that under some reasonable
assumptions, truthful reporting forms a Bayes-Nash Equilib-
rium. However, the mechanism must overcome the cost of
effort, which has to be computed empirically. If the cost of
effort is underestimated, then there may be agents who feel
incentivized to report according to heuristics rather than to
report truthfully. We can use the same analysis as in the previ-
ous subsection to show that these agents will be incentivized
to opt-out, rather than play the heuristic strategy, in many re-
alistic cases. Once again we consider two distributions Φ1
and Φ2 with the same assumptions as before. Let Φ1 be the
distribution of heuristic reports and Φ2 by the distribution of
truthful reports. Suppose we draw x1 points from Φ1 and x2
points from Φ2, with n = x1 + x2. Then we have our mixed
model Mc = x1M1+x2M2n . Suppose the Center has an inde-
pendent test set drawn entirely from Φ2. Then we have an
expected empirical risk:
Rc,2 = R2,2 +
x21r
n2
We define p = x2n as the probability that a data point is
truthful, and we compute the influences of a data point drawn
from Φ1 and of a data point drawn from Φ2:
−∂Rc,2
∂x1
= −2rp(1− p)
n
,−∂Rc,2
∂x2
=
2r(1− p)2
n
We can see that for p ∈ (0, 1), −∂Rc,2∂x1 is always negative
and −∂Rc,2∂x2 is always positive. Thus, if the Center has an
independent test set, Agents will always be incentivized to
report according to the correct distribution, and agents that
report according to heuristic will always receive a negative
reward, and thus will not participate.
In the general case, the Center won’t have access to an in-
dependent test set. It will draw samples from the reports to
build a test set. The mixed model Mc will then be evaluated
on the mixed distribution Φc = x1Φ1+x2Φ2n . Taking the em-
pirical risk Rc,c, we computing the following influences:
− ∂Rc,c
∂x1
=
p
n
R1,1 − p
n
R2,2 − p(2p− 1)r
n
− ∂Rc,c
∂x2
= −1− p
n
R1,1 +
1− p
n
R2,2 +
(1− p)(2p− 1)r
n
We wish to know under what conditions the agents report-
ing according to Φ2 will receive a higher reward than those
reporting according to Φ1:
0 < −∂Rc,c
∂x2
−−∂Rc,c
∂x1
Data Type 1st Order Approximation 2nd Order Approximation
L1 Relative L1 L2 L1 Relative L1 L2
Linear Generated 3.795e-06 4.806e-03 8.907e-11 2.470e-11 1.357e-08 7.218e-21
Red Wine 2.414e-05 1.571e-02 8.269e-08 7.728e-08 1.091e-04 4.544e-12
White Wine 3.925e-05 2.264e-02 7.929e-07 7.440e-07 1.347e-04 1.655e-09
Air Quality 7.353e-05 1.117e-02 1.426e-06 3.244e-07 8.076e-06 1.386e-10
Crime 1.745e-05 1.625e-01 6.963e-09 6.338e-07 2.653e-03 6.244e-11
Parkinsons 1.696e-02 3.519e-02 3.054e-01 6.958e-03 2.478e-03 1.471e-01
Table 1: Error between the Exact Influence and the 1st and 2nd order approximations on 1000 agents evaluated on 200 test points.
Figure 3: Ratio between Sum of Influences and Change in Loss with respect to batch size.
This yields:
p >
1
2
+
R2,2 −R1,1
2r
Intuitively, this shows that if the inherent error of the correct
model is greater than that of the heuristic model, then the
mechanism requires more than half the reports to be truthful.
Conversely, if the error of the correct model is less than that
of the heuristic model, then the mechanism is more robust and
does not require a majority of truthful reporters to maintain a
proper incentive for truthful reporting.
4 Experimental Results
Datasets: We present experimental results to demonstrate
the validity of our methods in real scenarios. We start by
enumerating the datasets used in our simulations:
- Linear Generated: We generate linear regression data as
follows: pick an angle θ uniformly in [−pi/2, pi/2], and a
bias term from N(0, 1). Using θ and the bias to determine
a linear model, we uniformly sample x ∈ [−1, 1] and deter-
mine ground truth ygt values. We then add a noise variable
drawn from N(0, 1) to produce observations y.
- Red Wine and White Wine: UCI datasets with 11 attributes
that predict a quality metric. [Cortez et al., 2009]
- Air Quality: A UCI dataset with 15 attributes. We removed
6 attributes because they are either non-predictive or they
have many missing values. We chose ”C6H6(GT)” as the
predicted attribute. [De Vito et al., 2008]
- Communities and Crime (Crime): A UCI dataset with 128
attributes. We remove 27 attributes because they are either
not predictive or they have many missing values. We use
”ViolentCrimesPerPop” as the predicted attribute. [Red-
mond and Baveja, 2002]
- Parkinsons Telemonitoring (Parkinsons): A UCI dataset
with 26 attributes. We removed 4 attributes because they
are either non-predictive or they are redundant predicted at-
tributes. We use ”total UPDRS” as our predicted attribute.
[Tsanas et al., 2009]
Approximation Accuracy: We show in Table 1 that on all
datasets, our Second Order Approximation formula produces
much better influence estimates in terms of absolute and rel-
ative absolute error than the First Order Approximation pre-
sented in Koh and Liang [2017].
M-Inclusive and M-Exclusive: We ran simulations to es-
timate the effect of batch size on the ratios Dinc and Dexc.
We ran each simulation with 1500 total training points with a
varying batch size. Given a fixed batch size, we ran 10 trials
for every dataset and aggregated them to form a more gen-
eral estimate of Sinc, Sexc, and ∆R. We then took the ratios
of these aggregates and compared against our theoretical re-
sults for Dinc and Dexc in Fig. 3. We ran this same simulation
with different numbers of initial points 20, 100, 200, and 500.
We have chosen only to show the case with 500 initial points,
although the other simulations show the same relationship.
5 Conclusion
Federated learning with self-interested data providers re-
quires incentives to ensure that data is of good quality, and
that it is contributed as early as possible. For learning re-
gression models, we have presented a novel incentive scheme
based on influence functions that makes truthful reporting of
accurate data a game-theoretic equilibrium. We have shown
how influence can be approximated and processed in batches
for efficiency, and developed a theory that allows correcting
the difference between the influence and the overall change
in loss. If the Center has a utility function that is non-linear
with the loss of the model, this can even be passed on to the
payments. We also analyzed the influence of agents that re-
port heuristically without making the effort to collect actual
data. We have empirically validated the theoretical results on
multiple datasets. Although we have not addressed privacy in
this paper, incentives are computed through matrix operations
that can be carried out privately using multiparty computation
[Du et al., 2004]. We plan to investigate this and other options
in future work.
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